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Elsewhere, writing in January, 1992, I indicated my belief
that we are witnessing "the emergence of a community expecta-
tion: that those who seek the validation of their empowerment"
must "patently govern with the consent of the governed. Democ-
racy, thus, is on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one
that increasingly will be promoted and protected by collective
international processes.."'
This optimistic view of the tide of human events was sup-
ported by evidence that, as of late 1991, there were more than
110 governments "legally committed to permitting open, multi-
party, secret-ballot elections with a universal franchise."2 I also
observed that most of these governments had switched from
authoritarian to democratic validation within the decade.
Although these still valid statistics continue to astonish, the
problematic of the "democratic entitlement" that I sketched in
* © Thomas M. Franck. This article is a draft of a chapter in the author's
forthcoming book to be published by Oxford University Press.
** Murry and Ida Becker Professor of Law and Director, Center for International
Studies, New York University School of Law.
1. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Goverance, 86 AM. J.
INTL L. 46, 46 (1992).
2. Id. at 47.
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1992 has become significantly more problematic. By this I do
not mean that the bloom is off the rose. On the contrary, the
widely, even fiercely, held aspiration propelling the democratic
entitlement towards normative and institutional realization
continues to move people everywhere. On January 29, 1994, at
a conference organized by the New York University Center for
International Studies, the ambassadors to the U.N. for Ethiopia
and Sierra Leone emphatically dismissed the idea that electoral
democracy is a western idea and not a value given priority in
the nations of the Third World. Denouncing this critique, which
is still advanced with considerable intellectual vigor by, among
others, former President Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore, the am-
bassadors insisted that democratic participation in the national
political process is as prized a value in Africa as in Europe or
North America.
Thus, the proposition I advanced in 1992 has not been invali-
dated: there is still underway a global tendency towards the
realization of the democratic entitlement. What has changed is
our growing comprehension of the complexities inherent in that
move. Nothing today seems as simple as it did two years ago.
While there is more striving for peace and reconciliation
through democratic-in place of military-struggle in places like
Cambodia and Mozambique, elsewhere, the transition from com-
munist totalitarianism has been marked by a disintegration of
social order. The "end of history" has been seen for its light-
headed absurdity. Instead of ending, history has become messi-
er. Paradoxically, the appeal of totalitarian law and order has
acquired a new cachet where it has been succeeded by civil
war, corruption, and criminal rampage. In some places, elector-
al politics have become the foreplay of tribal war.
So it is time to rethink, retheorize, review. In this essay I
shall briefly summarize the origins of the modern idea of a
global democratic entitlement. Next, I will summarize the evo-
lution of the norms and institutions which explicate, monitor,
and seek to enforce the right to democratic governance and the
legitimate exercise of legitimated power. Finally, and primarily,
this essay will explore the contemporary complexities, the "grey
areas," wherein lie controversy and, one hopes, enlightenment
as we pursue, and seek to shape and hone the emerging right
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to democracy in accordance with ascertainable global public
policy, minimum general expectations, and values.
This is not a dreamer's errand. In seeking to shape and hone,
we shall strive to cut our normative cloth to fill the contours of
the real world. We shall seek to calibrate the degree of common
resolve and the extent of common resources available to protect
and promote democracy through multilateral means, without over-
or under-estimating the imminent prospects of reaching an El
Dorado of perfect democracy. Our reach, in effect, should exceed
our grasp, but not too much.
The first of the new complexities that make the democratic
problematic more complex than it seemed even a mere two
years ago is the definitional one, which we will discuss in detail
later, in the coda of this essay. But a few words on this subject
must be spoken right at the start. Definition is no mere linguis-
tic exercise; it is a call to think strategically. While it may be
true, as Edmond Cahn once observed, that some lawyers would
not throw a drowning person a life preserver until the victim
had first defined the term "help," it is surely inevitable that
when we speak of a democratic entitlement, the definitional
question should be raised promptly and-explored thoroughly.
Perhaps the way for Americans to begin consideration of the
matter is to look for a familiar benchmark. Is the United States
federal government a democracy? The answer is not as self-
evident as it seems. Bear in mind that many of the most inci-
sive incisions and sutures in our corpus juris are made by judg-
es holding life tenure and elected by no one. Judicial gover-
nance is not democratic, and no nation on earth has more gov-
ernment by judiciary than the United States: with India and
Germany, their constitutions patterned after ours, the distant
runners-up. Bear in mind, too, that our nation's elected federal
legislature and elected presidency are confined, in their exercise
of political power, by a constitution that we, contemporary
Americans, neither wrote nor are able to amend except with
great difficulty. Consider, also, that our laws are made by a
senate elected on a basis which significantly skews the "one
person, one vote" principle. And, recall that our President and
Vice President are elected by an electoral college also capable of
egregiously distorting the result of the popular vote. Then,
recall that our cabinet officers rule without popular mandate,
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unlike cabinet ministers of many parliamentary democracies.
And, lastly, consider that the United States, once more out of
step with many parliamentary democracies, imposes no cap on
a political candidate's electioneering expenditure of personal
resources, thereby creating an electoral playing field demonstra-
bly tilted towards the very rich.
Do these aspects of our system disqualify us as a democracy?
Instinctively, we say "no," and we thereby demonstrate that
when we speak of democracy, we use the term in a
situationally-relative sense. Absolute democracy, we acknowl-
edge, is a condition of power-validation which no society-not
even cantonal Swiss plebiscitary governance-embodies totally,
to the exclusion of all countervailing considerations. Every de-
mocracy compromises democratic theory in socio-political prac-
tice. The countervailing considerations inducing such compro-
mise may include, as Madison and Lord Acton so well under-
stood, the need to protect the rights of minorities in the enjoy-
ment of their basic rights and freedoms from abridgment by
majoritarian preferences. There are other reasons why
majoritarian preferences may be set aside: for example, to en-
courage stability and continuity, or in deference to history,
geography, ethnicity, or even traditional elitism. An elite defer-
ence still perpetuates both Britain's House of Lords and our
electoral college. Our Senate represents a preference for historic
decentralized federalism over equal representation based on
population.
For the purposes of this definitional introduction, such brief
allusion to the counter-majoritarian constraints found in our
own system of national governance alerts us to two elementary,
but necessary, points of reference for our exploration of the
democratic entitlement. One is that any nation's commitment to
democracy is always a matter of degree, and, as we lawyers
know, matters of degree, create the "grey areas" beloved by
lawyers. A second point is that what really matters, what pub-
lic policy and law seek to define and protect through the demo-
cratic entitlement, is not some unattainable, impracticable abso-
lute democracy, nor the highest possible degree of democracy,
but, rather, a minimum standard for democratic validation.
Such a standard does not seek to define the absolute ideal of
democracy, nor does it prescribe the "best" mix of democratic
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and counter-majoritarian ingredients in governance. Instead,
the democratic entitlement creates a presumption in favor of
governance by the free, equal, and secret expression of popular
will. However, this is a rebuttable presumption. As a presump-
tion, the democratic entitlement is satisfied when each depar-
ture from the presumptive standard is justifiable in accordance
with commonly accepted subsidiary principles: that is, stan-
dards of deviation commonly accepted as necessary and proper
in a free society.
For example, the European Convention on Human Rights in
article 17 explicitly permits the prohibiting of "any activity
or ... act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms" of others.' Article 15 states that parties to this in-
strument are permitted to "take measures derogating from its
obligations" in "time of war or other public emergency threaten-
ing the life of the nation."4 In article 10, the European Conven-
tion establishes the right of "everyone" to "freedom of expres-
sion" but also permits
restrictions .. . as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for pre-
venting the disclosure of information received in confidence,
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.5
It needs to be stressed that these exceptions are not exercis-
able solely at the political whim of governments but are review-
able by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights.
The Commission and Court have exercised that power to strike
an appropriate balance. These judicial bodies have found that a
government has failed to demonstrate that a restriction on a
protected democratic right has been adequately justified by
exceptional necessity.6 On the other hand, they accepted as
3. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 17, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 234 (entered into force Sept. 3,
1953) [hereinafter European Convention].
4. Id. art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
5. Id. art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
6. Lingens Case, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1986); see MARK JANIS &
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valid the German Government's explanation as to why its pro-
portional representation system of elections excludes from par-
liamentary representation any party receiving less than five
percent of the popular vote.
What may usefully be gleaned from all this is the contextual
nature of the democratic entitlement, its non-absoluteness. But
the non-absoluteness of a rule carries with it a special burden
to establish legitimate processes for resolving disputes in the
"grey area" between the rule and the exceptions. It will be
useful to return to these definitional problems, which are prolif-
erating even as the democratic entitlement itself proliferates. At
this stage, however, it may suffice simply to note that the term
is used in this essay in full cognizance that it denotes, in prac-
tice, a matter of degree, a tendency. But-and this is impor-
tant-even as we recognize this contextuality, we reject the
notion that it renders the core notion of an entitlement
meaningless. On the contrary, as with so many of society's
fundamental norms, an admission of the relativism made mani-
fest by the definitional enterprise should whet the lawyer's
appetite for more exacting normative parameters and legitimate
processes for applying them. Good norms and good process
contain and restrict the nihilistic tendencies implicit in the
palimpsest of definition and deconstruction.
II. SOME HEAVY CONCOMITANTS OF THE DEMOCRATIC
ENTITLEMENT: AND WHY THEY FLY
"Democracy," etymologically speaking, is all about the role of
people in governance. It is about the right to be consulted when
political choices need to be made. It is an idea as old as the
Athenian polis, or the gathering of African elders around the
village Baobab tree. What is of relatively recent origin is the
idea that the right of people to be consulted in a meaningful
fashion is not protected solely by a nation's constitution, as it
has been for two hundred years in the United States, but, addi-
tionally, by international law.
The notion of international law, as I have argued elsewhere,7
RICHARD KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 258-65 (1990).
7. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
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rests, ultimately, on a theory of community and the concomi-
tant benefits and obligations which derive spontaneously from
membership in that association of nations. States, when they
think about international law, are empirically bound to say: "I
am, therefore I have and I owe: I have rights and I owe duties
or obligations." It would be premature, however, to insist that
every nation is now obliged, as an incident of its statehood and
its membership in the community of states, to govern itself
democratically. That is for the future to fashion, if it will. At
present, however, it can be asserted with adequate empirical
evidence that such an associational obligation is in the process
of coming into being; that, increasingly, it is being insisted
upon by the community of states as a prerequisite for admis-
sion of new applicants for full membership and its benefits. So
we stand on the cusp of a remarkable new idea: that each state
owes an obligation of democratic governance to all other states
as a price of its membership in the community of nations. And
more: each government, as an incident of membership in the
global intergovernmental system, owes to each of its citizens
the acknowledgment of his or her right to participate meaning-
fully in the process of governance. More extraordinary still is
the ensuing legal premise that when a citizen is denied the
democratic entitlement by his or her government, a form of
cause of action may lie in an appropriate international forum,
which may determine whether the denial is lawful. Finally, if
the denial is not sustained, the international system may pro-
vide a remedy to redress the international delict committed by
a government, perhaps under color of its own laws, against its
own citizens.
In this future, there will be two beneficiaries of the demo-
cratic entitlement or, conversely, two sets of aggrieved parties
when the entitlement is denied. One will be the community of
nations. The other will be the disenfranchised citizen. No won-
der the "democratic entitlement" is a controversial notion. Little
wonder it meets resistance, by no means only from actual or
potential transgressors. To the extent the democratic entitle-
ment becomes accepted international law, the ambit of sover-
eignty is commensurately diminished.
Yet, in the years since the collapse of communism, more than
fifty states-remember, we are speaking in relative contextual
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terms-have "gone democratic." They clamor at the United
Nations, in regional organizations, and at the doorstep of non-
governmental organizations, for credible monitors to observe,
and sometimes to run their first attempts at free and open elec-
tions. This seemingly paradoxical embrace, by sovereign govern-
ments, of a practice that, as it gradually evolves into customary
practice and law, is bound to diminish their sovereignty, can be
understood quite readily as a considered barter transaction
between those in power and the global system. A little sover-
eignty is surrendered for a lot of legitimacy bestowed. Only
citizens of governments long regarded as illegitimate, by their
own nationals as well as by the international community, can
fully comprehend legitimation's immense value to those who
would govern. Only to the extent a government is regarded as
legitimately validated can it count on the willing assent of
citizens and foreign states to its laws and practices. Legitimacy
is valued as the necessary, albeit not a sufficient, condition of
peaceable governance. That is why a credible, monitored elec-
tion is the sine qua non for ending civil wars in Nicaragua, El
Salvador, Mozambique, Angola and Cambodia. Increasingly, it
is also the ticket for admission to the benefits of the global
system: World Bank loans, most-favored-nation terms of trade,
IMF credits, bilateral aid, and so forth.
We thus can understand why the internationalization and
normativization of the democratic entitlement has both aroused
passionate opposition and yet made remarkable progress in
recent years. We live in a time when much governance is hob-
bled by a legitimacy deficit. To help remedy that condition,
governments have become more willing to accept the encum-
brance on sovereignty which the democratic entitlement impos-
es. In thus yielding a little, governments are purchasing legiti-
macy, but that is not all. They are also responding politically to
a deep-seated value, shared by their own citizenry in common
with those of most other nations. Within limits set by socio-po-
litical, cultural, and historic context, all people deeply desire a
meaningful say in the shaping of their destiny. Let no apolo-
gists for authoritarian quick-fixes tell you otherwise. As in our
national jurisprudence, the soil from which international law
springs is the loam of widely-shared social values. Participatory
democracy is becoming such a common value of humanity and
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it is to this value that international law is already starting to
respond.
III. CONTEMPORARY SOURCES OF THE DEMOCRATIC
ENTITLEMENT: SELF-DETERMINATION
Evidence that democratic consultation manifests a universal
value is to be found in the evolution of "self-determina-
tion"-democracy's grandparent-from a rather randomly-ap-
plied political expedient into a full-fledged international law,
defined in general practice and judicial decisions, incorporated
into treaties, and monitored as well as enforced by multilateral
organizations. The normativization of self-determination shows
the way the democratic entitlement will grow from shared value
to legal norm.
The right to self-determination is not identical to the right to
democracy. One deals with "peoples," the other with "persons."
One is a collective right, the other an individual one. Although
the collective desire of a '!people" to self-determine their collec-
tive destiny differs from the desire of a person to participate
individually in the shaping of that people's collective policy, the
common thread is readily apparent: the desire for meaningful
participation in a coherent socio-political process. Persons rally
to collective self-determination-by struggling for the sovereign-
ty of a nation, a tribe, or other identity group-primarily be-
cause they believe that their individual values and preferences
are more likely to be realized in a collective political entity in
which the shared identity of the participants ensures that
greater voice will be given to each individual's life choices. The
assumption that individual happiness can best be promoted by
establishing sovereign affinity-groups can be seen either as
logically impeccable or morally suspect, depending on the cir-
cumstances. India's pacific struggle for a secular, democratic
republic represents the bright face of self-determination. The
tribal wars of the former Yugoslavia and Angola represent a
darker visage. Both demonstrate the power of the drive for self-
determination.
Whatever its use or abuse, the urge of peoples to self-deter-
mination can be traced to antiquity. The exodus of the Hebrews
from Egypt to found their own nation on ancestral soil, three
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millenia ago,8 is echoed in the decision, at the Versailles Peace
Conference,9 to grant self-determination to the Danes of
Schleswig, the Slavs of the German and Austrian empires, and
to Poland.0 In important instances, the wishes of a "people"
was ascertained by plebiscites. U.S. Secretary of State Robert
Lansing, reacting against Woodrow Wilson's enthusiasm for
self-determination, prophetically surmised that "the phrase is
simply loaded with dynamite."" Nevertheless, Versailles, al-
though applying self-determination only imperfectly to parts of
the defeated empires in Europe, 2 unleashed social values and
launched a process of norm-formation that has reconfigured the
modern world.
This tendency to reconfiguration was universalized by the
United Nations Charter. At the insistence of the Soviet Union,
India, Ethiopia, and to a lesser extent, the United States, the
Charter placed former German, Japanese, and Italian colonies
under the trusteeship of states clearly required "to promote ...
progressive development towards self-government or indepen-
dence" in accord with "the freely expressed wishes of the peo-
ples concerned."" The first article of the Charter, moreover,
recognized self-determination as a fundamental right of all
peoples. Thus incorporated in a global law-making convention,
self-determination became an entitlement owed by governments
to subject "peoples" under their authority and by states to one
another. The International Court of Justice, in its Western Sa-
8. Exodus 1:2.
9. See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 20-
31 (1990). The use of self-determination at Versailles and subsequently is also dis-
cussed more fully in Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82
AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 743-48 (1988).
10. See 1 SARAH WAMBAUGH, PLEBISCITES SINCE THE WORLD WAR 13-16 (1933); 1
RAY S. BAKER, WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT 188 (1922); 2 A HISTORY
OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS 203-06 (H.W.V. Temperley ed., 1920); MICHLA
POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (1982); DENNA FLEMING,
THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 152-55 (1938). For example,
Czechoslovakia ended up with defensible boundaries only by denying self-determina-
tion to a large Sudeten-German minority.
11. ROBERT LANSING, THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, A PERSONAL NARRATIVE 97
(1921).
12. Self-determination was denied Upper Silesia, Fiume, and Sudetenland, among
others, for strategic and economic reasons. FLEMING, supra note 10, at 152-55.
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 76(b).
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ham Advisory Opinion, confirmed the primacy of this legal obligation. 4
The member states to whom this Charter norm was ad-
dressed-the colonial powers: Britain, France, Belgium, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain and the United States-with greater or
lesser alacrity, proceeded to implement the norm in practice,
thereby more than tripling the number of states in the U.N.
community. And the U.N. General Assembly, acting under arti-
cle 73(c), as well as the Trusteeship Council, saw to it that they
carried out the devolutionary requirement in a democratic fash-
ion. Thus, the U.N. created not only a binding legal obligation
but also the means to monitor and assess its implementation.
Visiting U.N. missions observed elections in dependent territo-
ries, mandated plebiscites where necessary, and established a
clear link between the right of a "people" to self-determination
and the democratic entitlement of persons to participate in the
process of designing their own sovereign institutions.15
That this normative process was able to generate a generally
orderly transition from colonial status to independence for more
than a billion subject-people cannot but have impressed on the
world's consciousness the utility of a rule which promotes the
right of peoples, collectively, to govern themselves.
The repertory of decolonization practice makes clear that the
right to self-determination is not absolute. For example, a rich
region may not be entitled simply to impoverish a larger entity
by breaking away from it. Indeed, the U.N. demonstrated this
in 1961, when it authorized the use of force to keep the
Katanga province united with Zaire." Again, the right is con-
14. 1975 I.C.J. 12.
15. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 66, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960). Since this supervisory U.N. role ceased upon a dependency's attaining
independence, it has sometimes been characterized sarcastically as "one man, one
vote, one time." Nevertheless, the right to self-determination has survived the end of
U.N.-supervised decolonization, as evidenced by the break-up of the Soviet Union and
of Czechoslovakia. Its continued legal efficacy is restated in article 1 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, re-
printed in 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The
same provision is stated as Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
16. S.C. Res. 5002, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 942d mtg., 4, 8, 9 (1961).
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textual and may require balancing with countervailing rights-
for example, those, like "territorial integrity," which are sup-
ported by notions of economic equity, geostrategic necessity, or
the protection of minorities. This means that there will be grey
areas; but "self-determination" remains a powerful root nurtur-
ing the democratic entitlement.
IV. CONTEMPORARY SOURCES OF THE DEMOCRATIC
ENTITLEMENT: CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
Alongside the collective right to self-determination of peoples,
contemporary international law has developed norms which are
intended to protect the individual freedoms of persons. We have
already referred to the European Convention on Human Rights,
a regional instrument. Chief among the universal instruments
incorporating rights of persons is the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights of 1966, which has been ratified by
over 100 states, most recently including the United States. 7
Article 1 of this Covenant serves as a bridge between the
collective rights born of the era of decolonization and the new
era of protected individual freedoms. It states that "[a]ll peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development."" Although
this provision, which proved very controversial at the drafting
stage,' 9 at first appears merely to restate the Charter's decolo-
nization norm, it subtly introduces two important adumbrations.
First, it makes self-determination generally applicable to all
"peoples" in the post-colonial era," and not merely to non-self-
17. 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1008 (June 5, 1992). But see Nadine Strossen,
United States Ratification of the International Bill of Rights: A Fitting Celebration of
the Bicentennial of the U.S. Bill of Rights, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 203 (1992), for a cri-
tique of the extensive reservations the U.S. included with its ratification.
18. ICCPR, supra note 15, at 173.
19. DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 14, 15 (1991).
20. Professor Rosalyn Higgins, a member of the Human Rights Committee of
Experts monitoring the application of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, has
written that the Committee has not had to determine which "peoples" are entitled to
self-determination under article 1 of the Covenant because claims, to date, have been
brought only by individuals under the Optional Protocol of the Covenant. The Option-
al Protocol, however, only envisages communications brought by "individuals . . .who
claim to be victims of violations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant."
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governing colonial peoples; and second, it firmly links (twice in
one sentence) the collective concept of self-determination with
the individual right of individuals "freely" to participate in civil
society and its political processes. The definition of freedom is
explicated in the rest of the Covenant which strongly emphasiz-
es the rights of individuals. It requires governments to accom-
modate the enumerated personal entitlements as the necessary
precondition of freedom.
The Covenant has its antecedent in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly as a non-
binding resolution on December 10, 1948.21 Among its provi-
sions are ones setting forth a universal claim to freedom of
expression (Article 19) and association (Article 20). Eighteen
years later, the Covenant, a nearly-universal and binding legal
instrument, built on the Declaration to specify the right of all
persons to freedom of thought (Article 18), expression (Article
19), and association (Article 22). While, as in the aforemen-
tioned European Convention, most of these political rights are
not absolute, but subject to restriction where "necessary...
[fIor the protection of... public order ... or of public health
or morals," the Covenant requires that the restrictions be im-
posed by law, rather than autocratic whim, and it makes their
"necessity" subject to review by an independent Committee of
Experts.22
Higgins observes that the:
Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee in turn emphasize
that the communication is to be submitted by the individual concerned.
There is no possibility for group or class actions under the Covenant
procedures. The Committee has thus been faced with the dilemma. The
right of self-determination is a right in the Covenant-albeit a right of a
different kind from the rest, standing alone in Part I of the Covenant.
But it is a right by peoples, not of any individual; and only, individuals
may bring communications.
Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of
Disputes: General Course on Public International Law of the Academy of International
Law, 230 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE [R.C.A.D.I.] 172-
73 (1991). Perhaps this obstacle can be surmounted in the instance of a claim
brought by a state party against another state party that has accepted the jurisdic-
tion of the Committee over such claims.
21. G.A. Res. 217A(lII), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
22. ICCPR, supra note 15, at 178.
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These personal freedoms-thought, speech and associa-
tion-are the sine qua non of political liberty. The Covenant, in
Article 25, underscores the individual right to democratic con-
sultation and participation by granting every citizen the right:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly
or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of
the will of the electors.2
It is remarkable that such extensive recognition of political
rights should have been the subject of agreement, even if more
apparent than real, in 1966, at the height of the cold war and
the spread of fashionable communist ideology. Since the col-
lapse of communism, the gap between appearance and reality
has begun to shrink. The General Assembly, in 1991, passed a
virtually unanimous, although non-binding, resolution which
puts an even more specific gloss on the emerging democratic
entitlement.24 It "stresses" the members'
conviction that periodic and genuine elections are a neces-
sary and indispensable element of sustained efforts to pro-
tect the rights and interests of the governed and that, as a
matter of practical experience, the right of everyone to take
part in the government of his or her country is a crucial
factor in the effective enjoyment by all of a wide range of
other human rights and fundamental freedoms, embracing
political, economic, social and cultural rights.'
This language is important for its sub-text, which refutes the
notion, still paraded by a few governments,26 that the advance-
ment of economic, social, and cultural rights may best be served
by restricting individual political rights and freedoms.
23. This provision echoes the terms of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which proclaimed the claim of all citizens to take part in government
and in "periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 21.
24. G.A. Res. 45/150, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/150 (1990).
25. Id. % 2.
26. Singapore, China, and Vietnam are examples.
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V. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE
DEMOCRATIC ENTITLEMENT
Not every nation is a party to the Covenant or voted for the
Assembly resolutions that spell out the democratic entitlement.
For those norms to become universal, they must be perceived
by the community of nations as legal obligations binding on all
governments. To this end, the members of the community have
created (i) institutional support for governments seeking to
make the stormy crossing from totalitarianism to democracy by
way of free and fair elections, (ii) institutional means to conduct
objective, periodic reviews* of all states' compliance with the
democratic entitlement, and (iii) precedents for collective action
in support of the entitlement in instances of its flagrant viola-
tion. These may be thought of as carrots, microscopes, and
sticks.
A. Institutional Election Support (Carrots)
Quite reasonably, the U.N. has fastened on elections as an
indicator of compliance with the democratic entitlement: one
which is necessary, even though not necessarily sufficient. Help-
ing states to conduct free elections thus is an aspect of promot-
ing compliance with the norm. Accordingly, acting upon specific
authorization by the General Assembly in 1991,2" the U.N.
Secretary-General has created an office to handle requests by
member states for assistance in organizing, conducting, and
monitoring national elections. The office not only helps to con-
duct national elections but helps to assure and even to certify
the fairness of the processY This is a considerable carrot,
prized by regimes where elections are novel and results might
otherwise appear to lack probity.
Such a U.N. role is not new. Under the trusteeship system
established by the Charter, the monitoring of elections in trust
territories became a routine practice. As early as May of 1956,
the Trusteeship Council dispatched monitors to a plebiscite in
British Togoland which determined whether its population
27. G.A. Res. 137, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doe. A/RES/46/137 (1992).
28. Id.
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wished to achieve independence in union with neighboring Gha-
na or preferred to be separate.29 In subsequent years, many
more elections, plebiscites and referenda were monitored by the
Trusteeship Council in such dependencies as the British
Cameroons (1959 and 1961),"° Ruanda-Urundi (1961),"' West-
ern Samoa (1961),"2 the Northern Marianas (1976),"s and var-
ious other parts of Micronesia (1983-86). 34 Similarly, a subcom-
mittee of the General Assembly has monitored elections in vari-
ous colonies en route to independence, including the 1965 ref-
erendum establishing a new constitution giving autonomy to the
Cook Islands,35  the 1968 pre-independence referendum in
29. Report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner for the Trust Territory of
Togoland under British Administration, U.N. Doc. T1258 and Add.1 (1956).
30. See G.A. Res. 1350, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No. 18A, at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/4090/Add.1 (1959) (whether the Northern Cameroons wished "to be part of the
Northern Region of Nigeria when the Federation of Nigeria becomes independent");
G.A. Res. 1352, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959)
(whether the Southern Cameroons wished to achieve independence by "joining the
independent Federation of Nigeria [or] the independent Republic of the Cameroons");
G.A. Res. 1473, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 38-39 (putting the questions
posed in the G.A. Res. 1352 plebiscite before the Northern Cameroons); see also Re-
port of United Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the Plebiscites in the
Southern and Northern Parts of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United
Kingdom Administration, U.N. Doc. T/1556 and app. (1961).
31. G.A. Res. 1579, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 34, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1961) (elections); G.A. Res. 1605, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16A, at
8, U.N. Doc. A/4684/Add.1 (1961) (referendum).
32. G.A. Res. 1569, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 33, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1961) (whether the inhabitants of the territory accepted "the Constitution
adopted by the Constitutional Convention ... on 28 October 1960" and endorsed
"that on 1 January 1962 Western Samoa should become an independent State on the
basis of that Constitution"); see also Report of United Nations Commissioner for the
Supervision of the Plebiscite in Western Samoa, U.N. Doc. T/1564 and Add.1 (1961).
33. Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the
Mariana Islands District, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, June 1975, U.N.
TCOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 24, U.N. Doc. T/1771 (1976).
34. See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in
the Federated States of Micronesia, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, June 1983,
U.N. TCOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 14, U.N. Doc. T/1860 (1984) (June 21, 1983
plebiscite for the islands of Truk, Yap, Kosrae and Ponape); Report of the United Na-
tions Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Marshall Islands, Trust Territo-
ry of the Pacific Islands, September 1983, U.N. TCOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 12-
13, U.N. Doc. T/1865 (1984) (1983 plebiscite); Report of the United Nations Visiting
Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Feb-
ruary 1986, U.N. TCOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 14, U.N. Dt'c. T/1885 (1986) (1986
plebiscite).
35. G.A. Res. 2005, U.N. GAOR, 19th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 7, U.N. Doc. A15815
(1965); Report of the United Nations Representative for the Supervision of the Elections
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Spanish Equatorial Guinea, 6 the 1969 referendum on the sta-
tus of West Irian, 7 and the 1980 pre-independence elections in
the New Hebrides. 8 This tradition of monitoring pre-indepen-
dence elections in dependencies has continued with recent inter-
national observation of the Eritrean plebiscite on independence
from Ethiopia. 9
More recently, the monitoring role has become more active.
With South Africa's decision to grant independence to South
West Africa (Namibia), the Security Council created UNTAG,
the United Nations Transitional Administration for Namibia,
with responsibility not only for organizing and conducting the
territory's first free and universal election, but also for manag-
ing Namibia's dependency's peaceful transition to indepen-
dence.4" UNTAG monitored the final months of South Africa's
administration, oversaw its military withdrawal, assisted in the
drafting of a new constitution and the repeal of racially-discrim-
inatory legislation, and facilitated an amnesty for political pris-
oners and the return of refugees and exiles. UNTAG's seven
thousand military and civilian personnel were deployed so effec-
tively that a historic transformation fraught with racial and
tribal animosities occurred peacefully, a model of collective self-
determination and respect for the democratic entitlement.41
Since then, the Security Council has authorized similar activ-
ist operations, using large U.N. administrative and military
units to facilitate peaceful political transformations. In these,
elections are a crucial element, but only one of many. Such
in the Cook Islands, U.N. Doc. A/5962 and Corr. 1 (1965).
36. G.A. Res. 2355, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/6716
(1967); United Nations Mission for the Supervision of the Referendum and the Elec-
tions in Equatorial Guinea, U.N. Doc. A/7200/Add.4, Anns. V, VI (1968). Independence
was formally achieved on October 12, 1968.
37. GAL Res. 1752, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 70, U.N. Doc.
A15217 (1962); Report of the Secretary-General Regarding the Act of Self-Determination
in West Irian, U.N. Doc. A/7723 (1969).
38. G.A. Res. 34/10, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 199, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1979); Report of the United Nations Mission to Observe the Elections in the
New Hebrides, U.N. Doc. A/34/852 (1979).
39. An Opening for Democracy in Eritrea, WAsH. POST, Apr. 30, 1993, at 18.
40. S.C. Res. 629, U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2842 mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. SINF/45
(1989).
41. Namibia, Independence at Last, UN MONTHLY CHRON., June 1990, at 4.
Namibia formally achieved independence on March 21, 1990. Id.
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authorization was given for U.N. operations in the Western
Sahara (1991),42 Cambodia (1992)"3  and Mozambique
(1992)." In each instance, the U.N. role has been far more
extensive than the mere monitoring of elections. It has entailed
negotiating, and then implementing, a complex agreement
among hostile parties for the reorganization of the nation, cul-
minating in the empowerment of a democratically-elected gov-
ernment. In each instance, the Security Council acted in re-
sponse to a request made by the government and the other
principal political parties preparing to participate in the demo-
cratic process. Behind such facade of agreement, there may oft-
times have lurked profound divergence, yet a forceful U.N.
presence-and U.N. conducted or supervised elections-helped
navigate the society past the shoals of civil conflict to the calm-
er seas of legitimate political authority.
That the U.N., in recent years, has developed an activist
mode of election supervision has not meant abandoning the less
intrusive mode. U.N. observers monitored the 1990 elections in
Nicaragua, which ended that nation's prolonged civil war. They
did so at the insistence of the Secretary-General, responding to
a request by the Government of Nicaragua,45 although his ini-
tiative later was formally approved by the Security Council.4"
U.N. monitors (ONUVEH) were also positioned in Haiti for the
elections of 1991 at the request of that nation's government and
on the authority of the Secretary-General,47 an initiative sub-
sequently approved by the General Assembly.'
42. S.C. Res. 690, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2984th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/690
(1991).
43. S.C. Res. 745, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RESI745
(1992).
44. S.C. Res. 797, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3149th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/797
(1992).
45. See The Situation in Central America: Threat to International Peace and Secu-
rity and Peace Initiatives, U.N. Doc. A/44/927 (1990) (Fifth report of the Secretary-
General United Nations Observer Mission). For the establishment of the U.N. moni-
toring mission, ONUVEN, see U.N. Doc. A/44/375 (1989).
46. S.C. Res. 637, U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2871st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/637
(1989).
47. Adoption of Agenda and Organization of Work; Letter Dated 17 July 1990
From the Permanent Representatives of the Bahamas, Columbia and Haiti to the Unit-
ed Nations, Addressed to the President of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 8, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/44/965 (1990).
48. G.A. Res. 45/2, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/2 (1990).
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Helping a state conduct peaceful and credible elections may
be a key to ending civil conflict, but this is neither self-evident
nor invariably the case. The "bad loser" scenario has led to-the
results of U.N.-supervised elections being overturned in Haiti
and a U.N.-monitored election being rejected by the loser in
Angola.49 In the Western Sahara one or both parties' apparent
unwillingness to risk losing the U.N.-supervised plebiscite has
succeeded in stalling the operation for more than a year.
It is becoming clear that the success of U.N. operations of
this sort depend on the extent to which the international com-
munity is willing to make a commitment commensurate with
the task and the predictable problems it entails. It is by no
means certain that the system is willing to make such a com-
mitment with the necessary resources and over a sufficiently
sustained period of time. To be sure, there are enthusiasts.
Some analysts have called for a sort of long-term U.N. "receiv-
ership" of nations which have destroyed their political system
and reduced them to "failed states." ° Others have observed
that this would merely reinvent the colonial era, with the U.N.
in the role of colonizer. John Stuart Mill, a century ago, argued
that democracy cannot be taught or imposed by outsiders.5
The costs have also been described as prohibitive. Yet there are
also costs in iystemic credibility when, as in Angola, the U.N.
makes a "quickie" cameo appearance in an election, on the
cheap, and then finds itself exposed to ridicule when the "bad
loser" reverts to war. Fearing just such failures and troubled by
the fiscal, personnel and legal implications of responding to too
many requests, the Secretary-General in recent years has re-
jected invitations to monitor elections in Romania, Lesotho and
Zambia.52 Yet, these prudent refusals also entail potential
costs to the peace and security of the international system, as
well as hindering the organic growth of the democratic entitle-
ment. Obviously, both the failures and demurrals point to lacu-
49. Troops Hold Sway in Wrecked Haitian Capital, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 4,
1991, at 11; Dos Santos Says Angola Must Not Remain Paralyzed on Brink of War,
UPI, Nov. 4, 1992, BC Cycle.
50. Gerald B. Helman & Steven Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POLICY
3 (Winter 1992-93).
51. JOHN S. MILL, 3 DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS: POLITICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL
AND HISTORICAL 238-63 (1873).
52. See U.N. Says It Won't Monitor Romanian Elections, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 1990.
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nae in global policy which require far more consideration than
they have hitherto received.
B. Institutional Review of Compliance and Noncompliance
A different sort of process, far less expensive, intrusive, and
risky, is employed to keep under review the practices of govern-
ments in general insofar as they affect the right of persons to
democratic participation in policy- and decision-making. This
review is continuous and is conducted by established institu-
tions with broad mandates to observe governments' compliance
with standards to which they have agreed. Evidence of noncom-
pliance and complaints of violation are scrutinized, discussed
with the governments concerned, and findings are made.
The outstanding example of this genre is the Human Rights
Committee of eighteen independent experts elected for four year
terms by the parties to the Civil and Political Rights Cove-
nant.53 Its task is quasi-administrative and quasi-judicial.
Monitoring of states' compliance with the Covenant is facili-
tated by their obligation to periodically "undertake to submit
reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to
the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the
enjoyment of those rights."54 The Committee scrutinizes these
reports in the presence of a representative of the reporting
state, and has the right to question the accuracy and sufficiency
of the report. In this, members receive considerable assistance
from nongovernmental human rights organizations which infor-
mally provide additional evidence of state conduct. The Commit-
tee then transmits its observations to the other parties and to
the Economic and Social Council.
Under an optional procedure in the Covenant,55 the Commit-
tee additionally may be empowered to hear complaints by one
state party against another. Parties may also accept the Option-
al Protocol of the Covenant which authorizes the Committee to
consider petitions by their citizens. 5
53. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 40(1).
54. Id.
55. Id. art. 41. For a discussion of this procedure see MCGOLDRICK, supra note
19, at 120-246.
56. ICCPR, supra note 15, Optional Protocol, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
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Under these several procedures, the Committee is beginning
to play an important role in monitoring compliance with those
aspects of the democratic entitlement established by the Cov-
enant. In its review of national reports it has been critical,
albeit in a circumspect manner, of the compliance of countries
like Uganda and Tanzania (respecting Zanzibar), 7 and has
posed searching questions to Mali" and Jamaica,59 among
others. So far, it has proceeded cautiously and by consensus in
dealing with country reports and citizens' complaints.
Some complaints of petitioners have been found to be valid.
For example, the Committee cited Uruguay's military regime for
violating a petitioner's right freely to engage in political and
trade union activities.0 In another case, the Committee found
a petitioner had been detained on grounds not permitted by the
Covenant article 19(3).61 The Committee has also held several
petitioners' rights violated by an order banning their political
party and prohibiting them from running for office.62
On an ad hoc basis, the Secretary-General may be authorized
to create a mechanism for monitoring compliance with human
rights, including the political right to democracy, as part of the
agreed process to end a civil war. A notable example is the
Mexico City Agreements of 27 April 1991, brokered by the Sec-
retary-General's Personal Representative. In it, the Government
and insurgents in El Salvador agreed to the establishment by
the Security Council of ONUSAL, the U.N. Observer Group in
El Salvador. 3 Under the control of the Secretary-General, its
mission is to ensure the "cessation of armed conflict," integrate
art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
57. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No.
40, at 42-43, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Report].
58. Id. at 50-51.
59. Id. at 56-57; see also MCGOLDRiCK, supra note 19, at 469-70.
60. Alba Pietroroia v. Uruguay, Communication R.10/44, 1981 Report, supra note
57, at 153-59.
61. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No.
40, at 111, U.N. Doc. A135/40 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Report]; see also Grille Motta
v. Uruguay, Communication R.2/ll, 1980 Report, at 132; Hertzberg v. Finland, Com-
munication R.14/61, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, at 161, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982).
62. 1981 Report, supra note 57, at 42-43; id., Annex XVI, at 153.
63. Central America: Efforts Towards Peace: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. S/22494 and Corr. 1 (1991); see also N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1991, at A8, col. 3.
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the insurgent forces into a new police force to observe the im-
plementation of citizens' rights, including free expression and
political association.' The agreement envisaged mutual disen-
gagement, disarmament, and reconstruction of an integrated
civil society. To this end, ONUSAL is authorized to observe "the
electoral process . . . to conclude with the general elections in
El Salvador in March 1994" which, the Security Council has
said, "should constitute the logical culmination of the entire
peace process ....
It is now almost inevitable that, when parties to a civil war
are ready to concede the impossibility of resolving the conflict
through armed struggle, they call on the U.N. to organize the
political infrastructure for a cessation of hostilities. In this
process, a U.N.-run, or closely observed, election invariably is
"the logical culmination." Most recently, this was the approach
used in Cambodia,66 Rwanda 7 and Mozambique." In Cambo-
dia and Mozambique the U.N.'s very extensive role included
working with the parties to write the electoral laws, enrolling
the voters, establishing the machinery for balloting and ballot
counting, and scrutinizing the polling and ballot counting.
While the success of this intervention by the U.N., sometimes
aided by regional and nongovernmental organizations, has been
beneficial to the war-ravaged state concerned, it has also helped
to develop a systemic practice which is capable of evolving into
customary law.
C. Enforcement
The United Nations system envisages collective measures
against violators of international law under Chapter VII of the
Charter. This requires a decision by the Security Council to
64. ONUSAL was established by the Security Council under S.C. Res. 693, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess., 2988th mtg., U.N. Doc. S1RES/693 (1991).
65. S.C. Res. 832, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3223d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES1832
(1993).
66. S.C. Res. 872, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES1872
(1993).
67. S.C. Res. 782, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3123d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/782
(1992).




deploy some or all of the means envisaged by articles 41, 42 or
43 of the Charter, ranging from severance of diplomatic rela-
tions, through trade embargoes, to direct military action by
U.N. forces or by national forces authorized to act on the
Council's behalf. Military enforcement actions of this sort have
been authorized in a few instances, beginning with Korea in
1950 and, most recently, to repel the Iraqi invasion of Ku-
wait.69 In only one instance, however, in the Security Council's
decision to impose a selective economic embargo on Haiti in
1993, has the Council resorted to enforcement measures to
compel a military junta to relinquish the reins of government to
a democratically-elected President.0
A decision to deploy collective measures requires the Council
to make the determination that there exists a threat to the
peace or breach of the peace. Prior to the Haiti military coup,
there were doubts whether even an egregious denial by a gov-
ernment of its own citizens' democratic entitlement would ever
be adjudged a threat to the peace. Now, the precedent has been
established by the Council's invoking Chapter VII to impose its
partial trade embargo.7' While it is not self-evident that the
overthrow of a democratic regime in a tiny island-nation is a
threat to international peace, the Council did come to that
conclusion. It is useful to consider why the precedent was set.
Its rationale necessarily relies on a connection between peace
and democracy. That connection was first made in Immanuel
Kant's essay, Perpetual Peace.72 Kant postulated a correlation
69. In the instance of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Council authorized "Mem-
ber States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait... to use all necessary
means to uphold and implement" the Council's demands on Iraq to withdraw from
Kuwait "and to restore international peace and security in the area." S.C. Res. 678,
U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990). For the Security
Council resolution authorizing U.S. forces to defend South Korea on the U.N.'s behalf
see S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 476th mtg., U.N. Doc. 5/1588 (1950).
70. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/841
(1993). In February, 1994, the Security Council began consideration of tougher eco-
nomic sanctions to restore democracy to Haiti. Steven Greenhouse, U.S. is Seeking
Tougher Embargo Despite the Strain on Haiti's Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1994, at Al.
71. The Council decided that "in these unique and exceptional circumstances the
continuation of this situation threatens international peace and security in the re-
gion." S.C. Res. 841, supra note 70.
72. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 107-39 (T. Humphrey rev. ed. 1983)
(1795).
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between the quality of a state's domestic governance and its
behavior towards others. In his view, perpetual peace was far
more likely to be achieved between states in which governments
are accountable to their people, than in autocracies. Modern
empirical scholarship has validated Kant's theory.73 There are
a number of ways in which Kant's hypothetical confluence be-
tween peace and democracy-and, conversely, between totalitar-
ianism and threats to the peace-is born out in practice. In the
instance of Haiti and elsewhere, the denial of democracy de-
monstrably leads to peace-threatening consequences. Dictator-
ships tend to rally publics by creating external enemies against
which military action is taken. Totalitarian rule frequently
generates civil war, flows of refugees, and eventually, draws ex-
ternal actors into surrogate warfare.
This is not invariably true, and all anti-democratic rule is not
identical, nor equally peace-threatening. That the Council may
use collective measures to enforce the democratic entitlement
does not prove that it must, or should, do so in every instance.
Nevertheless, as a matter of law, it is important to note that
the Council has demonstrated that it has jurisdiction to act,
even though jurisdiction is not tantamount to obligation. The
Council imposed a compulsory embargo on the delivery of oil
and petroleum products and police equipment on Haiti after its
military coup leaders made evident their refusal of U.N. de-
mands to restore the democratically-elected government of Pres-
ident Jean-Bertrand Aristide.74 The Council has also autho-
rized member states to use military force to put teeth in these
sanctions.75
Left for further consideration are the circumstances in which
the Council's enforcement power ought to be used. Obviously,
this decision should take into account case-specific contexts and
circumstances. Nevertheless, it is useful to begin to think nor-
73. See Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1151 (1986); see also Michael W. Doyle, An International Liberal Community, in RE-
THINKING AMERICA'S SECURITY (Graham Allison & Gregory F. Treverton eds., 1992);
Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act
of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992).
74. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 70; S.C. Res 873, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3291st
mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/873 (1993).




matively, as well as instrumentally, about a range of contingen-
cies: not merely because normative conduct will be perceived as
more legitimate than is action based purely on expediency, but
also because clear norms that credibly predict the response of
the international community serve to deter potential violators of
the democratic entitlement. As with nuclear deterrence, the
objective of all normative strategy-one which, up to a point,
predicts consequences of contingent actions in violation of estab-
lished rules-is to deter counter-normative conduct and, thus, to
avoid the need for a post-hoc enforcement.
In our conclusions we shall consider what bright lines such
norms might draw.
VI. REGIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC ENTITLEMENT
The increasing salience of a global democratic entitlement is
primarily evidenced by its dramatic emergence in the global
system. Any survey of this development, however, must also
note the parallel progress in some regional systems. This is
significant for the "larger picture" in two ways. First, the
regional systems may serve as engines to pull the global system
in the direction of selectively higher standards: more
demanding norms, better compliance, and more rigorous moni-
toring and enforcement. In that sense, a regional system may
be a laboratory for the global system. Second, regional respons-
es to violations of the global entitlement are likely to be more
sensitive to the socio-political context in which they occur and
thus may be more successful in shaping the best remedial
strategy. In practice, a two-tiered global and regional approach
is emerging, with concomitant benefits, but also with attendant
problems.
It is in Europe and the North Atlantic area that development
of the democratic entitlement recently has shown the most
vigor. In 1990, thirty-five members of the Conference on Secu-
rity and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 6 affirmed that "de-
mocracy is an inherent element of the rule of law" and recog-
nized "the importance of pluralism with regard to political orga-
76. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975,
73 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 323 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
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nizations."" The CSCE then spelled out in greater detail than
has the global system, the inalienable democratic rights of ev-
ery citizen. These include the right to participate in "free elec-
tions that will be held at reasonable intervals by secret ballot
or by equivalent free voting procedure, under conditions which
ensure in practice the free expression of the opinion of the elec-
tors in the choice of their representatives."78 The citizen is ac-
corded a right to a government "representative in character, in
which the executive is accountable to the elected legislature or
the electorate" and to political parties which are clearly inde-
pendent of the state.79
This "Copenhagen" statement is not a treaty, but is couched
in terms of opinio juris that indicate the participants' unani-
mous intent to shape regional customary norms. The declara-
tion also makes clear the parties' intent to link emerging demo-
cratic norms to a system of collective validation of governance,
stating that "the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed
through periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the au-
thority and legitimacy of all government.""
The CSCE declaration goes much further than the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant in defining the parameters of the
democratic entitlement. It requires "free elections at reasonable
intervals," for each national legislature. At least one chamber
must be "freely contested in a popular vote" for freely formed
political parties and freely nominated candidates for public
office. The election must be conducted in accordance with uni-
versal and equal adult suffrage, a secret ballot or its equiva-
lent, after a fair and free campaign. There must be "no legal or
administrative obstacle" to media access. Winners must be per-
mitted to take and hold office "until their term expires or is
otherwise" terminated in accordance with law.8'
The Copenhagen statement invites "observers from ... CSCE
participating States and any appropriate private institutions" to
77. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Document of the Copen-
hagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, reprinted
in 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1308, para. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Copenhagen Document].
78. Id. %1 5.
79. Id.
80. Id. 6.
81. Id. % 7.
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observe all national elections, and pledged the parties to
"endeavour to facilitate similar access for election proceedings
held below the national level."82
Later in 1990, these expansive but precise principles were
further developed by the CSCE in the Charter of Paris' in
which the leaders pledged to "co-operate and support each other
with the aim of making democratic gains irreversible."' The
following year, at the Moscow Conference on the Human Di-
mension of the CSCE, the members declared "that issues relat-
ing to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the
rule of law are of international concern, as respect for these
rights and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the
international order."' They "categorically and irrevocably" de-
clared "that the commitments undertaken in the field of the
human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legiti-
mate concern to all participating States and do not belong ex-
clusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned."86 Spe-
cifically, the members pledged that they would
support vigorously, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, in case of overthrow or attempted over-
throw of a legitimately elected government of a participat-
ing State by undemocratic means, the legitimate organs of
that State upholding human rights, democracy and the rule
of law, recognizing their common commitment to countering
any attempt to curb these basic values .... .7
The Moscow Document also sets forth a system for mediating
disputes in which one member alleges that another has denied
its own citizens' democratic rights.'
82. Id. 8.
83. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a
New Europe and Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the
Charter, Nov. 21, 1990, Preamble, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 190, 193 (1991) [hereinafter
Paris Charter].
84. Id. at 195.
85. Id.
86. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Document of the Moscow
Meeting on the Human Dimension, Oct. 3, 1991, Preamble, at 2 (unofficial text of the
U.S. delegation), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1670, 1672 (1991) [hereinafter Moscow Docu-
ment].
87. Id. 17.2, at 1677.
88. Id. %J 3-16, at 1673-77.
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These new norms of the CSCE and accompanying processes
have scarcely been tested. Nevertheless, democracy has become
a litmus test of the European Union for recognition of new
states in Eastern Europe89 and by the Council of Europe for
membership in that organization. 0 For example, the Arbitra-
tion Commission ("Badinter Commission") of the European
Union's Conference on Yugoslavia advised the Union's Confer-
ence on the Former Yugoslavia that recognition of Bosnia-
Herzegovina should await its government's acceptance both of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the CSCE's Charter of Paris.91 European regionalism has al-
so generated relevant treaty law. The Council of Europe's Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights92 establishes an
elaborate, legally-binding system for regional protection of basic
human rights. Article 3 of Protocol I of the European Conven-
tion essentially tracks the democratic entitlement set out in
article 25 of the International Civil and Political Rights Cove-
nant.9" Expressive and associational rights are expounded in
article 10, paragraph 1 of the Convention which states: "Every-
one has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart in-
formation and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers."' As with the global system, free-
dom of expression is treated as a relative and contextual right.
Paragraph 2 of article 10 permits
derogation in the form of restrictions ... necessary in a
89. European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and the Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States, Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485 (1992) [hereinafter Brussels
Document]. The test requires, inter alia, "respect for the provisions of the United
Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the
Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human
rights . . . ." Id. at 1487.
90. Yeltsin Wins Wide European Backing But Must Earn Council Seat, REUTER LI-
BRARY REPORT, Oct. 8, 1993, BC Cycle.
91. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions
Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Jan. 11 and July 4, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1488;
see also Brussels Document, supra note 89, at 1486.
92. European Convention, supra note 3.
93. First Protocol to the European Convention, 20 March 1952, art. 3: 'The High
Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret
ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the




democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for pre-
venting the disclosure of information received in confidence,
or for the maintaining of the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary."
Although the breadth of this "derogation" clause attracts
criticism, it resembles contextual limitations on First Amend-
ment rights implicit in U.S. courts' "clear and present danger"
test. 6 Under the European Convention, as in the U.S. system,
ultimate decisions about the necessity and propriety of restric-
tions are subject to judicial review. Both rights-based claims of
European citizens and the derogations claimed on grounds of
necessity by European governments are subject to review by the
European Court of Human Rights.97
The tribunal has developed a formidable jurisprudence,
weighing countervailing rights, and explicating, case by case,
parameters to guide parties through the inevitable grey areas.
Thus, it has weighed claims based on freedom of the press
against counterclaims to a fair trial,"8 public decency9 and
protection against libel or slander.0 0 While the process has
resulted in a somewhat different balance than the one in the
U.S., it probably accurately reflects the dominant values of
European public opinion. More to the point, the systemic weigh-
ing and balancing of these competing rights has been principled
and is widely perceived as legitimating the outcomes. It is a
credible process, the development of which significantly
outpaces-and, thus, may predict-the progressive development
of the global system.
An echo of this European regional system is heard in the
less-developed inter-American regional system. Its 1969 Conven-
95. Id.
96. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315, 319-20 (1951).
97. European Convention, supra note 3, art. 19. See also arts. 20-55.
98. The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
99. Handyside Case, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976); Case of Muller and Others,
133 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
100. Lingens Case, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).
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tion on Human Rights'0 1 establishes citizens' legal claim to
freedom of thought and expression, 10 2 assembly, and associa-
tion.103  As in Europe, a Commission 4  and Court'05
implement the norms, case by case, reconciling conflicts be-
tween competing norms and socio-political interests. In addition,
on June 5, 1991, the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of
American States adopted a resolution which states that the
OAS Charter principles "require the political representation of
[member] states to be based on effective exercise of representa-
tive democracy" and requires the convening of an immediate
meeting of the OAS Permanent Council "in the event of any
occurrence giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of
the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate
exercise of power by the democratically elected government in
any of the Organization's member states."0 6 This procedure
has been used in a number of cases discussed below, including
coups in Haiti, Honduras, and Peru.
VII. A NEW ISSUE AGENDA: NORMS AND BRIGHT LINES
This rehearsal of progress made towards a global and region-
ally-augmented democratic entitlement has demonstrated that
the cup, while half-filled, is also still half-empty. Although the
overall direction no longer seems in doubt, the obstacles are
also coming more clearly into focus. It is to these we now turn.
We shall examine three problems encountered in practice by
the global system in implementing the democratic entitlement.
We designate them, respectively, as the Angola/ Western Sahara
problem, the Haiti/Cambodia problem and the Algeria/Peru
problem. The names are merely symbolic shorthand.
The nub of the Angola/Western Sahara problem is this:
should the U.N. agree to participate in monitoring or conduct-
ing an election (or plebiscite) even when it is not able to deploy
101. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970)
(entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention].
102. Id., art. 13, 9 I.L.M. at 679.
103. Id., arts. 15-16, 9 I.L.M. at 688.
104. Id., arts. 34, 64(1), 9 I.L.M. at 685, 692.
105. Id., arts. 33, 62, 64(2), 9 I.L.M. at 685, 691-92.
106. Representative Democracy, OEA/ser.P/AGRES.1080(XXI-0/91), T 1.
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sufficient forces to compel the parties to abide by the results?
The Haiti/Cambodia problem poses a related question: should
the U.N. participate in organizing a country for democracy
without also deploying the capacity to create a civil society?
The Algeria/Peru problem solicits our thinking about an even
harder dilemma: should the international system accept that it
may sometimes be necessary for a regime to suspend democracy
in order to save it?
It is not our purpose, here, to examine the disputed realities
of Angola, Western Sahara, Haiti, Cambodia, Algeria or Peru,
but rather to create three idealized problem-paradigms in order
to examine the prospects for principled responses by the inter-
national system to three widely-perceived potential pitfalls on
the path to an established democratic entitlement.
A. The Angola/Western Sahara Dilemma
The emerging democratic entitlement is sometimes
misperceived as a form of peacekeeping undertaken "on the
cheap." For example, after a decade of civil war in Angola,
implicating not only rival domestic tribal factions but also
Cuba, South Africa, the Soviet Union, America and Zaire, the
two rival factions signed a peace accord in May, 1991. Thereup-
on, the U.N. Security Council authorized the Secretary-General
to deploy approximately one hundred unarmed military and
civilian observers (UNAVEM II) to monitor the implementation
of that accord. The U.N. personnel were authorized to "observe,
not conduct" the elections that were the capstone of the
agreement. °7
Although the U.N. observers were supplemented by others
from nongovernmental organizations, and although they did
eventually certify that the elections were reasonably free and
fair,08 the patently over-stretched monitoring operation lacked
107. Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, N.Y.
TMES, Mar. 1, 1993, at A14; S.C. Res. 696, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2991st mtg.,
U.N. Doe. S/RES/696 (1991); S.C. Res. 747, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3062d mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/747 (1992).
108. S.C. Res. 785, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3130th mtg., % 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/785
(1992) (supporting the statement of the Special Representative heading UNAVEM II,
"that the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 were generally free and
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credibility. When the opposition faction, UNITA, rejected an
outcome unfavorable to it, the U.N. observers were not only
ineffectual but became the target of new hostilities, ultimately
requiring rescue and hurried evacuation. What would have been
necessary to avert such a palpable deficit in U.N. credibility?
Should the U.N. refuse to monitor an electoral process unless it
is given the means to enforce the outcome? What are the appro-
priate "means" to enforce an electoral outcome against a "bad
loser"?'09
Somewhat similar problems of contingency planning and
response capability are raised by the U.N. operation in the
Western Sahara. On April 29, 1991, the Security Council autho-
rized the Secretary-General to create a U.N. Mission for the
Referendum in the Western Sahara."0 Under an agreement
achieved with U.N. mediation, the Government of Morocco and
the POLISARIO liberation movement were to end their twenty-
year war and give the U.N. responsibility to prepare the ground
for consulting the population on the territory's future in a free
and fairly conducted plebiscite. The terms called on the U.N. to
ensure security, facilitate large-scale repatriation of refugees,
oversee the withdrawal of rival militias and supervise the criti-
cal process of drawing up the electoral rolls."' For more than
three years, personnel of the U.N. mission have sat in the
Western Sahara, unable to compel the parties to make the
concessions necessary to implement the plan, yet unwilling to
admit defeat by withdrawing. The question raised by these
circumstances are similar to those raised by the U.N. in Ango-
la, namely: what are the preconditions for success, why were
they not insisted upon at the outset, and would it have been
best not to have launched the operation if those preconditions
could not be secured in advance: by the parties, by the interna-
tional community, or both? Although the circumstances of U.N.
involvement were different, in both Angola and the Western
Sahara the means assigned to each mission were clearly inade-
fair .... ).
109. The Council has threatened military sanctions against UNITA. S.C. Res. 851,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3254th mtg., 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/851 (1993).
110. S.C. Res. 690, supra note 42, 2.
111. The Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report by the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. S/22464 (1991).
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quate to the task. Can this sort of mismatch be rendered less
likely in future?
B. The Haiti-Cambodia Dilemma
On September 30, 1991, a military coup ousted Haiti's demo-
cratic government which, only a short time before, had been
elected in a vote conducted under elaborate U.N. auspices.
ONUVEH, a large U.N. operation, had shared responsibility
with the Organization of American States in managing the
transition from totalitarian to democratic governance. In report-
ing the success of this transition, however, the U.N. Secretary-
General had warned that elections are fragile mechanisms
when the democratic entitlement is not rooted in the socio-polit-
ical institutions and climate of a civil society. His prognosis was
confirmed by the military coup.
The U.N. has responded, but only ineffectually. A resolution
of the Assembly "demanded" restoration of the legitimate
government.112 Twenty months passed before the Security
Council, at last, enacted a selective trade embargo under Chap-
ter VIL." To the extent sanctions have been effective, they
have caused hardship primarily among the least-privileged in
Haitian society and thus provoked a conflict between the U.N.
and nongovernmental humanitarian relief organizations.
The failure of the U.N.'s effort to manage Haiti's transition to
democracy poses another aspect of the problem of matching
tasks to available means. In this instance, the problem is less
one of assuring the adequacy of the means deployed to permit a
democratic choice to be made than of determining the duration
of the U.N.'s commitment to the outcome. In Haiti, at its ze-
nith, ONUVEH had several thousand civilian personnel engaged
in the process, but they were withdrawn immediately after the
elections, with unsurprising consequences. What can we learn
from this? Should the international system undertake to con-
duct or monitor elections only if the parties agree to a longer-
term powerful U.N. presence and the U.N. members are willing
112. GA Res. A/46/L.8/Rev.1, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 1, 2, 4, U.N. Doc.
A/46/L.8/Rev.1 (1991).
113. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 70, [1 5-14.
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to supply the necessary means? Should states, to qualify for
assistance in organizing the transition to democracy, be re-
quired to accept a longer-term stewardship by the global sys-
tem? For how long? Is the U.N. membership willing to make
the necessary long-term commitments?
The same question is raised by the U.N.'s role in ending the
civil war in Cambodia. The Security Council implemented a
peace plan devised by the Cambodian factions. In a resolution
of February, 1992, it authorized a mission (UNTAC) to super-
vise a "national reconciliation" and to ensure "the right to self-
determination of the Cambodian people through free and fair
elections .... ,,
When UNTAC was fully in place, the U.N. had approximately
thirty thousand personnel on duty in Cambodia. Although the
Supreme National Council, under its President, Prince Norodom
Sihanouk, administered Cambodia during this transition,
UNTAC played a key role in every aspect of governance. It
implemented the agreed cease-fire in the face of provocations,
particularly by the Khmer Rouge." 5 On May 23-28, 1993, the
elections were held, peacefully and successfully, leading to the
formation of a new democratic government." 6 By the end of
August, however, the Security Council had decided to terminate
UNTAC, with the withdrawal of U.N. forces to be completed by
November.' 7 An exception was made for twenty military li-
aison officers to monitor the security situation for a further six
months."8
Given the known capabilities and intentions of the Khmer
Rouge, should the international community have made a longer-
term commitment to protect the democratically-elected govern-
ment? What form would such a commitment take? What effect
would it have on Khmer sovereignty? What would it cost?
114. S.C. Res. 745, supra note 43.
115. See S.C. Res. 810, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3181st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/810
(1993).
116. S.C. Res. 840, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3237th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/840
(1993).
117. S.C. Res 860, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3270th mtg., I 3, 4, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/860 (1993). See also S.C. Res. 880, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3303d mtg., IT 10,
11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/880 (1993).
118. S.C. Res. 880, supra note 117, 9 12.
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Would states be prepared once again to shed blood in Cambo-
dia? On the other hand, if Cambodian democracy is not to be
guaranteed by the international community, was it prudent to
have invested so heavily in the carrying out of the Paris Agree-
ments?
C. The Algeria-Peru Dilemma
In January 1991, the National Liberation Front, the political
party which had governed Algeria since its independence in
1962, was decisively defeated at the polls by the Islamic Salva-
tion Front (FIS) in the nation's first free multiparty parliamen-
tary election. The fundamentalists won more than three million
votes, and captured 188 of 231 contested seats. To prevent FIS
from taking power, the army deposed President Chadli
Benjedid, cancelled the final round of elections that would have
consolidated the fundamentalists' victory, and named a five-man
committee to rule the country under military auspices."'
Since then, politics has been replaced by terrorism (both by
and against fundamentalists). Nearly 2,000 persons have been
murdered by militant terrorists and death squads. A campaign
of assassination and terror against Algerian intellectuals, judges
and journalists has paralyzed efforts to restart a national dia-
logue of reconciliation.' Nations most directly affected by
events in Algeria include France, to which half a million Algeri-
ans are expected to flee if a fundamentalist regime succeeds in
establishing itself in Algiers, as well as Morocco, Tunisia and
Egypt which, having attained some degree of secularization and
electoral democracy, fear an ideological spill-over effect on their
still-fragile civil societies.
The fundamentalists' success at the polls in 1991 reflects the
deep discontent of the majority of Algeria's disadvantaged popu-
lation. Algeria's external debt crisis has led to stringent eco-
nomic reforms devised by the International Monetary Fund
119. Chris Hodges, Islamic Guerillas in Algeria Gain Against Military Rulers, N.Y.
TMES, Jan. 24, 1994, at Al.
120. The militants are reported to have forsworn "all dialogue, all truce and all
reconciliation." Kim Murphy, Algeria's New Lessons in War, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27,
1993, at Al.
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which have plunged the economy into steep recession.'" Un-
employment among persons aged fifteen to thirty is reported to
stand at 84 percent.
The military-backed regime of Algeria argues with some
conviction that, had it not stepped in when it did to halt the
elections, they would have empowered a regime committed to
the abolition of electoral democracy, the equality and political
rights of women, and toleration of religious and political
dissent. Parallels have been drawn to Hitler's Nazi Party suc-
cess at the polls in Germany and to the success of the
Zhirinovsky-led Liberal Democrats in Russia.'22 The claim
made by the Algerian armed forces is that they had to destroy
democracy in order to save it. "Sadly," the human rights organi-
zation Middle East Watch has reported, "the regime has done
little in the field of human rights to distinguish itself from
the ... human rights disaster it claimed to be prevent-
ing . ... ,,2" As civil war approaches, it is predicted by observ-
ers that outright military rule will be imposed and the facade
of civilian rule swept away. With FIS banned, and thousands of
Islamic Fundamentalists in detention, the movement both has
gone underground and become more extreme. The time for
coopting them into the democratic process, if it ever existed,
appears to have passed leaving little choice except between
polar forms of authoritarian repression. 24
In Peru, too, democracy has been suspended by those who
claim to want to save it. Although President Alberto Fujimori
had been elected in a free and fair election, he perceived his
task to be made impossible by the Shining Path rebellion,
which, in twelve years, had claimed 25,000 lives, controlled
forty percent of the countryside, and terrorized the judiciary.
The crisis was worsened by deadlock in the legislature, where
Fujimori had little support. On April 5, 1992, he dissolved Con-
gress and suspended both the constitution and habeas corpus.
121. Id.
122. Western Islamic Militants Will Be Hit By Secular Arabs and European
Nationalists, APS Diplomat News Service, Dec. 27, 1993, at 9.
123. Algeria Condemned for 'Human Rights Disaster,' THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 4,
1994, at 9.
124. Caryle Murphy, Algeria's Secular Army, Islamic Militants Battle for Power,
WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1994, at A4.
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The next day, the OAS summoned a meeting of its foreign
ministers, which adopted a resolution stating that "representa-
tive democracy can only be promoted and defended through the
means it upholds." 5 The resolution rejected "any other way
as contrary to the fundamental principles established in the
OAS Charter... 11126 It took notice of the commitment made
by President Fujimori to "summon immediately the election of a
constituent congress through an electoral process invested with
all guarantees for the free expression of the people and to re-
store representative democracy in his country.""' The
resolution's demand for "effective return of the representative
democratic system as soon as possible, within the framework of
respect for the principle of separation of powers and the rule of
law" was specified as a precondition of "the full reinstatement
of international assistance and aid."' Notably, however, the
OAS did not impose economic sanctions, in view of President
Fujimori's promise to permit the election of an eighty-member
Congress to write a new constitution and exercise limited legis-
lative powers. These elections were held in November and de-
clared "free and fair" by international observers, including 250
OAS observers and a U.S. Congressional delegation.'29
Fujimori's party won thirty-eight percent of the vote and forty-
four congressional seats and, despite the boycott of the elections
by main traditional Peruvian parties in an effort to avoid legiti-
mating the result, the U.S. and other OAS states chose to re-
gard it as a first step back to democracy and the rule of law. In
January, 1993, apparently free and fair municipal elections
were held and opinion polls since the coup showed Fujimori's
public support consistently above fifty percent.30 Finally, in
November, 1993, the Peruvian voters narrowly endorsed a new
125. See OAS Ad Hoc Mtg. of Foreign Ministers, Resolution on Support for the
Reinstatement of Democracy in Peru, Res. 1192 of April 13, 1992, and OAS Ad Hoc





129. Gary Marx, Saying Election Was Fair, U.S. Weighs Restoring Aid to Peru,
CHi. TRIB., Nov. 24, 1992, at C4.
130. James Brooks, Peru's Leader Clears a Path with Sharp Elbows, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1993, at A3.
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constitution which, while entrenching a strong presidency, re-
turned Peru to a democratic system.
These political developments, contrasting sharply with those
in Algeria, were accompanied by the capture on September 12,
1992 of the leadership of the Shining Path rebel movement
whose insurrection had led to more than 25,000 killed and
property losses of $23 billion.'' By the end of 1993, Peru
seemed to be back on the road to significant economic growth
with which to underpin a reasonably democratic political sys-
tem.1 2 By the end of 1993, the World Bank and bilateral gov-
ernmental assistance agencies were again opening their purses
to Peru.
Fujimori's initiative, and his "success" in working his way
back into the good graces of the Peruvian people and the inter-
American and global system, was bound to spawn imitators. A
"copycat" auto-coup was attempted in mid-1993 by President
Jorge Serrano Elias of Honduras. This effort, however, met with
far more determined sanctions imposed by the United States
and other leading trading partners in the American system, as
well as by a general strike. The Serrano takeover collapsed
after just a few days.
The Fujimori coup was perceived as a response to a true and
profound crisis while that in Honduras was not. Fujimori, more-
over, was able to convince the world that he was sincere in his
efforts to restore a form of participatory electoral democracy
and would do so with deliberate speed. Serrano had no such
credibility. Fujimori permitted his actions to be ratified quickly
by an internationally monitored plebiscite, as well as congres-
sional and municipal election. And, lastly, Fujimori was able to
defeat the insurrection which had destroyed the Peruvian econ-
omy and, with it, the faith in government essential to function-
ing democracy. In this, the Peruvian case stands in contrast
also to that of Algeria, allowing us to deconstruct the central
question: how should the global system respond to claims that
democracy must at times be suspended in order to save it?
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The new issue agenda, symbolized by the three exem-
plars-Angola/Western Sahara, Haiti/Cambodia, and Alge-
ria/Peru-poses difficult choices which cannot be evaded indefi-
nitely without undermining, perhaps fatally, the emergent dem-
ocratic entitlement. There are several reasons for this. First: an
entitlement which is enforced only occasionally, with no attempt
at drawing principled distinctions between instances of enforce-
ment and nonenforcement, is not a principle capable of deter-
ring counter-normative behavior. Second, a norm selectively
enforced, without benefit of a principled basis for making dis-
tinctions, will be regarded as unfair and thereby lose its legiti-
macy. If the democratic entitlement is to be perceived as credi-
ble and principled, norms must be developed to deal with the
hard cases that test the rule, while retaining the rule's capacity
to respond flexibly to contextual factors.

